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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Reply Brief is dedicated to pointing out the four 
major failings of Respondents' case: 1) that Respondents can 
cite no precedent for their interpretation of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act (hereinafter the "Act"); 2> that 
Respondents' arguments and conclusions are unsupported by 
the record; 3> that Respondents' arguments and conclusions 
are incorrect interpretations of the law; and 4) that the 
decision of the Executive Director, and the affirmance of 
that decision by the District Court, is unsupported by the 
record and unsupportable in fact and in law. 
Further, this Reply Brief will once again show that the 
Respondents have acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and in 
contravention to their duties pursuant to the Act: in 
denying Appellants' applications for registration by 
notification; in alleging without proof, and in direct 
contradiction to the language of the Act, that registration 
by notification is in some manner less "worthy" than other 
methods of registration; in alleging without proof, and in 
direct contradiction to the St i pulat i ons, that the 
registration statements of Appellants have "minimal" rather 
than full and fair disclosure; in alleging without proof, 
and in direct contradiction to all precedent and 
interpretations, that the sales of these securities to 
Appellants were not exempt transactions; and, in alleging 
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without proof or foundation in the record or in fact that 
the proposed transactions by Appellants, even if the 
securities are registered, would be in violation of the 
policies and purposes of the Act. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
SECTION 14.5 OF THE ACT DID NOT TRANSFER THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF FROM THE DIVISION TO THE 
APPELLANTS BUT ERRED IN FAILING TO PLACE THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE DIVISION AND IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS WERE INCONCLUSIVE AND 
UNPERSUASIVE. 
Respondents' Brief would read as though to mislead 
the Court as to the correct application, and as to the 
previous applications, of the burden of proof in this case. 
After correctly paraphrasing one paragraph of Koeslino 
v, Basamakis (539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975)), at page 22, 
and correctly stating that the Division, as the proponent, 
has the burden of proof, Respondents' Brief omitted the 
following and extremely relevant language: 
The burden of persuasion does not shift, 
however, and remains upon the party asserting the 
proposition. Thus, where, as here, the proponent 
has the burden of persuading the trier of fact by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that is, that the 
asserted proposition is more likely than not, he 
carries that burden throughout the trial. 
Koesl m o , 539 P.2d at 1046. 
In direct contradiction to this, Respondents' Brief 
would imply that the burden of persuasion was, and remains, 
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on Appellants. Further, and without a single citation to 
the record, Respondents baldly assert that they met their 
burden of proof although neither the Executive Director nor 
the District Court so found. 
As shown by Respondents' own arguments, both the 
Executive Director and the District Court placed upon the 
Appellants the burdens of proving and persuading them that 
Appellants were "non-issuers" and were eligible to register 
the securities by notification. (See Respondents' 
Br i ef. at 22 through 23.) This alone is adequate 
grounds upon which to vacate the Order
 t as the United 
States Supreme Court did in Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corporation. 318 U.S. 80 (1943), 
reh'g on remand, 332 U.S. 194 (1947): 
The Commission's action cannot be upheld merely 
because findings might have been made and 
considerations disclosed which would justify its 
order as an appropriate safeguard for the 
interests protected by the Act. There must be 
such a responsible finding. . . . 
review requires that the grounds upon which the 
administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed 
and adequately sustained. 
Chenery. 318 U.S. at 94. 
Both the Executive Director and the District Court have 
failed to recognize that the Division did not meet its 
burdens on the record. Respondents' misconstruction of the 
record on this matter, and bald assertions to the contrary, 
cannot change the fact that both bodies incorrectly placed 
the burdens of proof and persuasion upon the Appellants and 
cannot change the fact that the record itself contains no 
evidence which could be said to meet the Division's burdens. 
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B. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT CERTAIN 
ITEMS WERE FINDINGS OF FACT WHEN EACH IS ACTUALLY 
A CONCLUSION OF LAW AND EACH IS AN INCORRECT 
INTERPRETATION OF LAW UPON WHICH THE ORDER OF 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WAS SUBSTANTIALLY BASED. 
Once again, Respondents' Br i ef would read as though 
to mislead this Court on an important matter. This issue is 
extremely relevant in that the standards of review for 
findings of fact and for conclusions of law are different. 
Contrary to the Repondents' statement that Section 23 of the 
Act "limits the scope of review of this Court to determining 
whether the Executive Directors decision is supported by 
competent, material and substantial evidence" 
<Respondents/ Br i ef at 6, lines 20 through 23), Section 
23 actually states that "[t]he findings of the executive 
director as to the facts« if supported by competent, 
material and substantial evidence, are conclusive." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is, therefore, vital to determine which items are 
findings of fact and which items are conclusions of law. 
Appel1 ants" Br i ef clearly outlines the items erroneously 
claimed to be findings of fact (Appelants" Brief at 5 
and 2? through 34) and the Respondents have not argued 
otherwise. Respondents have only argued as to the scope of 
review of the entire case. 
As to the specific matters placed in issue on appeal by 
Appellants, and as to all of the questions of law in this 
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case, this Court's review is guided by its decision in 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Com'n. 658 
P.2d 601 <Utah 1983), and falls between the standards of 
reasonableness or rationality and correction of error. The 
questions of law in this case are questions of first 
impression with regard to statutory interpretation. In such 
cases, the agency's interpretation of a statute is not 
entitled to great weight. This Court's review, particularly 
as to questions of law, is not a rubber stamp, but rather, 
as the final arbiter of the law in the State of Utah, this 
Court is required to determine whether the conclusions of 
law in the case were correct. As this Court stated, in 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 
293, 333 P.2d 1061 <1958): 
If the record contains support of any substance 
for its findings and determination, its order must 
stand. However, a review by this Court is 
provided for, and it is undoubtedly intended to 
amount to something more than a mere rubber 
stamping of any action the Commission might take 
by placing some control upon extremes of arbitrary 
action by the Commission. It cannot go so far as 
to base an order creating new carrier authority, 
which in effect takes business away from existing 
carriers, upon a showing which under scrutiny is 
so ephemeral as to practically vanish. 
Id. at 1063. 
C. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT, WITHOUT COMPETENT, MATERIAL AND 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD, ERRONEOUSLY 
FOUND THAT APPELLANTS WERE NOT "NONISSUERS" WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION CONTAINED IN SECTION 13(12) OF THE 
ACT. 
Respondents'" argument as to this issue is limited to 
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four points: 1) that the proposed distributions would be 
" sp i n-off s" ; 2) that "value" and "benefit" are synonymous; 
3) that Appellants are "co-issuers"; and 4> that the 
purposes of the Act are subverted by registration by 
notification. 
1. The Proposed Distributions Are "Spin-Offs", 
Respondents argue that the proposed distributions are 
"spin-offs" and imply that such transactions are in 
violation of the policy of the Act. Respondents' 
implication mi sconeieves both the history of the Act and the 
mission of the Divison, as shown by their reliance upon the 
decisions in Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Datronics Engineers, I n c . 490 F.2d 250 <Cir.4 1973), 
and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Harwyn 
Industries Corp.. 326 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
These cases dealt with a loophole in the law called the 
"no-sale theory", which provided among other things, that 
dividends of another issuer's securities were not "sales" 
and were therefore not subject to the registration 
requirements. Because of this, large amounts of 
unrealstered securities were being distributed in 
spin-offs. The courts, in Harwyn and Patronics 
extinguished the "no-sale theory", which had been embodied 
in Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 133, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission rescinded that rule in 
1973. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has taken the position that most spin-offs require 
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registration. (See National Environmental Controls. 
Inc•. SEC No-Action Letter, September 2, 1980, 1981 
Decisions <CCH) Paragraph 76,729, where registration of 
spin-off shares was required: and Nat i onal Techn i cal 
Systems. SEC No-Action Letter, January 10, 1985, 
1984-1985 Decisions <CCH) Paragraph 77,922, stating "this 
Division will not recommend any enforcement action to the 
Commission if UES shares are distributed as proposed 
without compliance with the registration requirements 
of the 1933 Act/ (Emphasis added.)) Until 1983, Utah 
also had the "no-sale theory" in effect. However, the 1983 
amendments to the Act added subsection (cXvi) to Section 
13(15)'s definition of "sale" and provided that a "dividend 
of a security of another issuer is an offer or sale." 
Thus, spin-offs are not considered "evasions" of the 
law, but now merely need to be registered transactions. 
Spin-offs are, in fact, popular and legitimate business 
transactions. (See, e.g., Statistical Spotlight: The 
Parts and the Uhole. FORBES, March 25, 1985, page 264; 
studying 31 major spin-offs since 1981 including those of AT 
& T, Texas Int'l, and Time.) As the Court stated in 
Chenery: 
[Blefore transactions otherwise legal can be 
outlawed or denied their usual business 
consequences, they must fall under the ban of some 
standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of 
government authorized to prescribe such standards 
— either the courts or Congress or an agency to 
which Congress has delegated its authority. 
Congress itself did not proscribe the 
[transactions in question]. . . • Established 
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judicial doctrines do not condemn these 
transactions. 
Chenery. 318 U.S. at 92-3. 
In Utah, such transactions were not made illegal and 
carry no implication o-f wrong-doing. Rather, these 
transactions are clearly provided -for in the corporate laws 
and are recognized in the 1983 amendments to the Act as 
legitimate business transactions. 
2. "Value" and "Benefit" Are Not Synonymous. 
Respondents argue, mistakenly relying again on 
Harwyn and Patronics, that "value" and "benefit" are 
synonymous, that the issuers in this case receive "value", 
and that, therefore, the proposed distributions are not 
"non-issuer" transactions. Respondents have failed to 
address three main issues on this point: A) that the 
Legislature chose to use "value" in Section 13<15) and 
"benefit" in Section 13(12) of the Act, rather than use the 
same term in both sections; B) that the Legislature provided 
that the transaction must be "for the benefit o£ the 
issuer" (emphasis added) and not that it must provide 
any value to the issuer; and C) that Appellants have 
provided overwhelming case law and administrative 
interpretations from similar jurisdictions which provide 
that the "benefit" in Section 13(12) of the Act includes 
only monetary benefits to the issuer. Respondents have not 
provided any precedent to show, and have not met their 
burden of proving, that their interpretation of Section 
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13(12), which directly contradicts the plain language of the 
Act, is correct. In -fact, Respondents have -failed to show 
that the proposed distributions are -for any purpose other 
than to benefit Appellants' shareholders. 
3. Appellants Are Not "Co-Issuers". 
Respondents argue that they have met their burden of 
proof on this issue by making completely unsupported 
statements, such as: "CaDn underwriter, which is not a 
non-issuer"; "[a] party who is a controlling person of the 
issuer is also an issuer"; and "Ci]f strict categorization 
were mandated, the results would often be tenuous, if not 
absurd." (Respondents' Br i ef at 19.) These 
unsubstantiated conclusions do not meet Respondents' burden 
of proof i n that: 
A) The plain language of the Act provides for 
two exclusive categories; and 
B) Section 24(1) of the Act prohibits the 
Division from classifying persons on a 
case-by-case, order-by-order basis; and 
C) The Act specifically does not deal with 
"underwriters" and "control issuers" as does the 
Securities Act of 1933; and 
D) The 1983 amendments to the Act would be 
vitiated if Appellants were deemed to be issuers, 
since the proposed transactions would not even 
constitute "sales" of securities if the Appellants 
were the issuers of such securities. 
The first two points have not even been countered by 
Respondents. The second two points require some further 
discussion. As previously pointed out by Appellants, the 
crux of the Securities Act of 1933 is its definition of 
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"underwriter". This definition is used, on the federal 
level, to prevent a series of allegedly exempt transactions 
from taking place when, in substance, a non-registered and 
non-exempt public offering has occurred. The state 
statutes, including the Act, are set up differently and do 
not provide for an "underwriter". The state statutes 
provide only for "issuers" and "non-issuers". That is, 
whereas the Securities Act of 1933 provides only for the 
original distribution of securities, the state securities 
statutes are supposed to provide for the secondary markets 
as well. (See, e.g., Jennings & Marsh, Securities 
Regulation, 4th Ed. 1975, pp. 1270 through 1271.) The 
use of "underwriter" in the Securities Act of 1933 is to 
ensure that no original public distributions of securities 
occur without registration. As such, it is useless to 
include such a term in a statute, such as the Act, which 
regulates a!1 offers and sales of securities. 
Although not at issue in this case, Appellants confirm 
that under the Securities Act of 1933 Appellants would be 
considered to be "underwriters" and would have to register 
the securities before distributing them to the public. This 
is clearly inapposite, however, since what Appellants are 
attempting to do is register. Whether Appellants would be 
"underwriters" under the Securities Act of 1933 is 
inconsequential: the definition of "underwriter" under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is used merely to define persons who, 
in addition to the issuer, must register securities prior to 
distributing such securities to the public. Such a 
-Page 10-
definition is not contained in the Act and is not relevant 
to the Act since al1 persons who offer or sell 
securities in Utah must either register such securities or 
claim a valid exemption from registration. Again, 
Respondents have attempted to turn cases of non-registration 
into relevant precedent by ignoring the vast distinction 
between registration and evasion of the Act. The terms 
"underwriter" and "controlling person" are irrelevant 
because Appellants are seeking to register the securities in 
question and because Appellants are seeking to comply with 
the Act rather than evade the Act. 
Respondents further allege that Appellants are "issuers" 
within the meaning of Section 13(11) of the Act. This is 
patently absurd in view of the 1983 amendments to the Act. 
If such an interpretation were adopted, Section 
13<15)<c><vi) would be entirely meaningless. That section 
provides that a "sale" includes a "dividend of a security of 
another issuer." If Appellants were considered to be the 
issuers of the securities in question, then the proposed 
transactions would not even be within the definition of 
"sale" in the Act. This is clearly not what the Legislature 
intended when it abolished the "no-sale theory" in 1983. 
The Legislature intended, as did the Securities and Exchange 
Commission when it rescinded Rule 133, that spin-offs would 
be "sales" within the definition of the Act. The only 
interpretation of "issuer" and "non-issuer" which would 
carry out this intent, is that the subsidiaries of 
Appellants are the "issuers" of these securities and that 
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the Appellants are "non-issuers" of these securities. 
Respondents" allegations that Appellants are the "issuers" 
or "co-issuers" of these securities would vitiate the 1983 
amendments to the definition of "sale". 
4. Registration by Notification Is In Compliance 
wi th the Act. 
The least credible and least supportable argument of 
Respondents is that registration by notification results, in 
some manner, in less than full disclosure to potential 
investors and is in violation of the policy and purposes of 
the Act. Respondents" argument that registration by 
notification results in anything but full disclosure to 
potential investors is completely unsupported. 
Respondents" Br i ef (at 12 through 15) spends three pages 
quoting from a "hornbook" on Blue Sky regulations which can 
only be read to support Appellants" arguments: which shows 
that, in fact, the specific information requirements for 
registration by notification are greater than those for 
registration by coordination. Respondents have failed to 
address, however, the only two issues relevant to this 
particular point: 1> that registration by notification is 
provided for in the Act; and 2) that Section 1 of the Act 
provides for full and fair disclosure with respect to 
aj_l offers and sales of securities. These issues are 
fully discussed in Appellants" Brief <at 32 through 33, 
64 through 669 and 72 through 7 3 ) . While Respondents would 
have this Court believe that registration by notification 
-Page 12-
"subverts" the purposes of the Act and provides for minimal 
disclosure, Respondents cannot provide a single instance of 
a misstatement or omission in Appellants' registration 
statements and Respondents cannot, with any seriousness, 
argue that registration "subverts" the Act, the purpose of 
which is disclosure through registration. 
In summary, Respondents have not shown that Appellants 
are not "non-issuers". Respondents have provided no 
applicable case law, no applicable previous administrative 
interpretations, and no realistic statutory interpretation 
by which Appellants could be considered to be anything but 
"non-issuers". Despite the clear language of the Act and 
the precedent provided by Appellants, Respondents'" basic, 
untenable argument is that registration by notification, in 
accordance with the standards set by the Legislature, is 
wrongful. 
D. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT NO 
DECISION WAS NECESSARY WITH RESPECT TO COUNT II OF 
THE PETITIONS OF THE DIVISION. 
Respondents' only argument as to this issue is that 
"further issue determination at this point would be an 
unreasonable expense of the Director's resources" 
(Respondents' Br i ef at 24, lines 8 and 9). As 
Appellants have stated (Appel1 ants' Br i ef
 t at 52 
through 54), the allegations contained in Count II of the 
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Pet i t i ons, in and of themselves, cause harm to 
Appellants and to the issuers unless dismissed. It cannot 
be an "unreasonable expense" to prevent such continuing harm 
since the Division itself created the situation, and it 
would not have created any "expense" or used any "resources" 
to dismiss Count II of the Pet i t i ons since the matter 
was already briefed and under consideration. 
E. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO FIND FOR 
APPELLANTS AS TO COUNT II OF THE PETITIONS OF 
THE DIVISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS HAD 
MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Respondents argue, once again, that the orginal issuance 
of the securities to the Appellants was not an exempt 
transaction. Respondents have cited cases involving the 
distribution to the public of unregistered securities 
and argue that such cases are applicable here. Respondents 
have been unable to cite a single case which integrates an 
exempt offering with a registered offering as is the case 
here, because such a case would fly in the face of the Act. 
Re sp on de n t s ' Brief relies upon Secur i t i es and 
Exchange Commissi on v. Mono-Kearsaroe Con. Min. Co., 
167 F.Supp. 248 <D.Utah), a 1958 Federal District Court case 
involving allegations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission that an issuer was liable for subsequent resales 
of unreoi stered securities. Respondents/ Br i ef 
claims that "Celven though the underlying reason in Mono 
-Page 14-
was to prevent unregistered securities from being publicly 
issued, and Appellants are attempting to register the 
securities before distributing them, the Mono ruling 
should still be applied" (Respondents' Br i ef at 26, 
lines 20 through 24). This is in direct contradiction to 
the opinion itself, which states: 
The basic requirement is that registration 
must occur before any security is offered or sold 
unless there is involved either an exempt security 
or an exempt transaction. 
Mono-Kearsaroe, 167 F. Supp. at 252. 
Respondents have admitted that the initial issuances of 
the securities to Appellants, without any subsequent 
distributions, met the requirements of the exemptions 
(St i pulat i on #9> and have failed to show that subsequent 
registered distributions of such securities would cause 
the loss of those exemptions. Respondents have failed to 
show this because it is not a correct or even supportable 
interpertation of the law, because it directly contradicts a 
federal rule on this K^ery point (see Appel 1 ants' Br i ef 
at 57), and because it flies in the face of the policy of 
the Act. 
F. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED ISSUES OF LAU 
THAT WERE NEVER RAISED BY ANY PLEADINGS AND WHICH 
WERE NOT CONSIDERED ISSUES PURSUANT TO THE 
PRE-HEARING ORDER AND SUPPORTED SUCH DECISIONS 
WITH FACTS NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD THEREBY 
DEPRIVING APPELLANTS OF THE PRIOR NOTICE AND 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING REQUIRED BY SECTION 12 OF 
THE ACT. 
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As stated in Appel 1 ants' Br i ef <at 8 through 9 
and 54 through 63), the decision of the Executive Director 
was based on conclusions of law which were not in issue and 
which were erroneous. Some of such issues were first raised 
in Respondents' original Br i ef which was filed 
simultaneously with Appellants' original Br i ef: some of 
such issues appear for the first time in the Order of 
the Executive Director. 
This Court stated, in R.U). Jones Trucking v. Public 
Service Commission, 64? P.2d 628 (Utah 1982), that: 
[A] party before the [Public Service] Commission 
is entitled to "the essential elements of due 
process of 1 aw . . . notice, and an opportunity to 
be heard and defend in an orderly proceding 
adapted to the nature of the case, before a 
tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause." 
Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 <1939). 
Id. at 629. 
Appellants were not provided such notice and opportunity as 
to these issues and, as this Court state, in Morr i s v. 
Public Service Commission. 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 
(1958), in vacating certain administrative orders: 
This court in the case of Los Angeles and Salt 
Lake Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 
stated, quoting in part from another decision: 
"The commissioners cannot act on 
their own information. Their findings 
must be based on evidence presented in 
the case, with an opportunity to all 
parties to know of the evidence to be 
submitted or considered, . . . and to 
offer evidence in explanation or 
rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as 
evidence which is not introduced as 
such." 
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If the Commission had intended to entertain the 
issue . . ., it should have notified Watson and 
informed him specifically of the grounds upon 
which cancellation was being sought. 
Id, at 646. 
Respondents have offered no explanation for the 
mysterious appearance of these issues and have offered no 
argument for the bases of the decisions except for the basic 
policy that registration by notification is in some way in 
violation of the policy of the Act. This "explanation" 
alone is not only insufficient, but is in direct 
contradiction to the purposes of the Act and of the 
Di visi on . 
6. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR INCORRECTLY 
FOUND THE ORDER TO BE IN THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" 
AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE 
DIVISION HAD MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THIS 
ISSUE. 
Respondents argue that the Order was in the public 
interest because the Respondents now allege that 
Appellants intend to "create a market for the shares" and 
that registration by notification provides for "minimal 
disclosure." (Respondents Brief. at 10 through 11). 
Initially, it should be noted that neither of these 
allegations was contained in the Petitions or any of the 
pleadings in this case and neither was, therefore, in issue. 
In addition, neither of these allegations is supported by 
the record and Respondents^ Brief does not provide a 
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single citation to the record with respect to these matters. 
Further, neither of the allegations is true and correct. 
For these reasons, the Order must be vacated. 
Respondents have argued strenuously, since their 
original Brief, that registration by notification in 
and of itself provides for minimal disclosure and that a 
"market" would be "created" for the securities to be 
distributed in violation of the intent of the Act. Neither 
of these matters was in issue pursuant to the narrowly drawn 
Fre-Hearino Order. These issues, and many others (see 
Appel1 an tsx Br t ef . at 63 through 6 8 ) , were not presented 
to Appellants until after the decision of the Executive 
Director was issued. As stated above, the deciding of 
issues of significance to Appel1 ants without prior notice 
and opportunity for hearing violates Section 12 of the Act 
and the due process rights of Appellants. 
Further, there is no evidence on the record to support 
these allegations. In fact, the only evidence on the record 
as to these allegations directly contradicts the position of 
Respondents. Appellants' registration statements contain 
numerous declarations to the effect that no market exists 
for these shares and no market may ever exist for these 
shares. These registration statments and the 
Stipulations are the only facts in evidence in this 
case. As to "minimal disclosure", the Division's 
allegations of fraud were dismissed at the pre-hearing stage 
when the Division could not show a single material 
mi statement or the omission of a single material fact. 
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Despite the outright dismissal of these allegations, 
Respondents continue to claim such matters are in issue. 
Finally, Respondents' claim that "the Director 
recognized that the State has a valid interest in preventing 
such a vast distribution of these types of shares when only 
minimal information is made available to possible buyers and 
traders" (Respondents' Brief at 11, lines 2 through 5) 
is absurd. Respondents freely admitted that "these types of 
shares" are permitted effective registrations unhampered by 
the Division (Stipulation #29). There is nothing about 
either the securities themselves or the transactions which 
is unusual or could distingush them from hundreds of other 
applications for registration. Appellants have not 
attempted to hide behind a shareholder vote, as claimed by 
Respondents (Respondents' Brief at 18), but rather have 
claimed that the "value" of the proposed distributions to 
Appellants' shareholders should be left to such 
shareholders' determination as provided for by corporate 
law. It is not within the province of the Respondents to 
determine for shareholders or potential shareholders whether 
the proposed transactions will benefit them or whether such 
transactions are for valid business purposes. (See 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green. 430 U.S. 462 
(1977).) As stated in Fred J. Schwaemmle Const, v. 
Dept. of Commerce. 360 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1984): 
The Legislature never intended that the bureau 
be involved, under the guise of the securities 
act, in the internal affairs of a corporation or 
partnership once the sale of securities has been 
successfully and properly completed. Blue sky 
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laws are not intended to protect investors from 
financial loss in general, but from fraud which 
may lead to such financial loss. 
Id, at 148. 
The speculation that a market for these securities would 
develop is completely unfounded. Further, even if such a 
market did develop, it would be based upon full disclosure 
of all material facts about the issuer, and the development 
of such an orderly and informed market is one of the goals 
of the securities laws. 
Respondents cite the note to the 1983 amendments of the 
Act (Respondents' Br i ef at 9 through 10) and state that 
maximum disclosure is the goal of the Act. Such maximum 
disclosure is not provided by any specific registration 
provision, but by the requirements of Section 1 which apply 
to al1 offers and sales of securities. Respondents' 
initial allegations under Section 1 were dismissed because 
Respondents could not show a single material misstatement or 
omission in Appellants" registration statements. Yet, 
without foundation, Respondents continue to allege that 
Appellants' registration statements provide only "minimal 
disclosure." (Respondents' Br i ef at 12, 15, 17, 18 and 
27.) If there was "minimal disclosure" in the registration 
statements in this case, then Section 1 would clearly 
prohibit the offer or sale of securities pursuant to these 
registration statements. There simply cannot be such a 
thing as "minimal disclosure" where full and fair disclosure 
pursuant to Section 1 has been given. 
In summary, Respondents have decided, without evidence 
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on the record, that it is in the public interest to den/ 
Appellants/ applications to register securities despite the 
fact that the purpose of the Act is to provide disclosure 
through registration, despite the fact that these 
registration statements provide full disclosure, and despite 
the fact that there is no evidence on the record that could 
possibly be interpreted to show that such distributions 
would or could harm any person. The Order of the 
Executive Director cannot stand for the same reasons that 
the administrative order was overturned in Bur 1 inoton 
Truck Lines v. U.S.« 371 U.S. 156 (1962): 
There are no findings and no analysis here 
to justify the choice made, no indication of the 
basis on which the Commission exercised its expert 
discretion. . • . Expert discretion is the 
lifeblood of the administrative process, but 
"unless we make the requirements for 
administrative action strict and demanding, 
expert i se « the strength of modern government, 
can become a monster which rules with no practical 
limits on its discretion-". . . The Commission 
must exercise its discretion . . . within the 
bounds expressed by the standard of "public 
convenience and necessity." . . . And for the 
courts to determine whether the agency has 
done so, it must "disclose the basis of its order" 
and "give clear indication that it has exercised 
the discretion with which Congress has empowered 
it. 
Id. at 167-168. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Respondents have failed to meet their 
burdens of proof and persuasion, failed to show that 
sufficient facts exist on the record to support their 
conclusions, failed to show that the Order is in the 
public interest, and failed to distinguish the overwhelming 
precedent on these issues from the present case. The 
Order of the Executive Director was entered without 
support on the record and without giving Appellants notice 
and opportunity for hearing on most of the issues decided. 
Finally, the decision of the Executive Director and the 
affirmance of the District Court are in direct opposition to 
those of other jurisdictions with similar statutes and to 
those of the Securities and Exchange Commission in similar 
factual situations. These decisions have no basis in fact 
or in law and this Court must, therefore, reverse the 
decision of the District Court and vacate the Order of 
the Executive Director. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1986. 
-Page 22-
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
this REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was delivered to the office 
of Nick Hales, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Attorney for 
Respondents, on this 3rd day of January, 1986. 
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